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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
THE PROSECUTOR V. ELIÉZER
NIYITEGEKA, CASE NO. ICTR-96-14-T
On May 15, 2003, the Trial Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda rendered its judgment in the case of
The Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka. The
amended indictment charged Niyitegeka with
genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy
to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, four counts of
crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, rape, and other inhumane acts), and two
counts of serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II. The prosecution withdrew the war crimes charges in its closing
brief. Niyitegeka was charged with individual
responsibility under Article 6(1) of the ICTR
Statute for all counts, and with superior
responsibility under Article 6(3) for all counts
except conspiracy to commit genocide. He
was found guilty of individual responsibility
under Article 6(1) for genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and three counts of
crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, and other inhumane acts) and was sentenced to life in prison.
Niyitegeka was a journalist and news
presenter on Radio Rwanda. He was sworn
in as Minister of Information of the Interim
Government on April 9, 1994. He was also
Chairman of the Mouvement Démocratique
Républicain (MDR) in the Kibuye
Prefecture from 1991 to 1994, and a member of the national political bureau. The
Trial Chamber found that, between April
and June 1994, he transported soldiers and
weapons to an attack on Rwandan Tutsi,
whom he called “Inyenzi” or “Cockroaches;”
that, together with other prominent figures,
he led several large-scale attacks by soldiers,
policemen, and Interahamwe (paramilitary
forces) against Tutsi refugees, during which
“Tuba Tsemba Tsembe” (“let’s exterminate
them”) was chanted; that he shot at Tutsi

refugees during these attacks; that he personally murdered an old man, a young boy, and
a young girl; and that he instructed attackers
where to go and how to attack refugees.
Based on the findings above, as well as
Niyitegeka’s attendance and participation at
meetings held to plan and organize the
killing of Tutsis, his acts of incitement and
encouragement,
his
ordering
of
Interahamwe to mutilate the body of a dead
Tutsi woman, and his encouragement of the
killing and subsequent mutilation of a
prominent Tutsi leader, the Chamber ruled
that Niyitegeka caused serious bodily or
mental harm against the Tutsi ethnic group
with the specific intent to destroy them in
whole or in part. He was consequently
found guilty of genocide and not guilty of
the alternative charge of complicity in genocide. The Chamber also found him guilty of
conspiracy to commit genocide for participating in an agreement between two or more
persons to commit genocide.
The Chamber additionally found that
Niyitegeka had directly or publicly incited
genocide because he had both the specific
intent to commit genocide and the intent to
“directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide.” The Chamber followed the
Akayesu definition of “direct and public.”
The Chamber thus considered whether the
incitement was “public” in “light of the place
where the incitement occurred and whether
or not assistance was selective or limited,”
and whether it was “direct” in “light of its
cultural and linguistic content.” The
Chamber found that Niyitegeka had told
attackers to go to “work,” which they had
understood to mean kill Tutsis, and which
had led to the launching of an attack.
Moreover, at a subsequent meeting held to
organize the next day’s killings, Niyitegeka
had thanked and commended the attackers
for their “work,” and encouraged them to
participate in future attacks.
Due to the methodical, organized, and
large-scale nature of the attacks in which
Niyitegeka participated, the Trial Chamber
found that he had committed murder, exter34

mination, and other inhumane acts with the
knowledge that these acts were part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population on national, political,
racial, or religious grounds. The Chamber
found Niyitegeka not guilty of rape as a
crime against humanity due to insufficient
evidence that he had raped a young girl or
“caused women to be raped.”
In finding Niyitegeka guilty of murder as
a crime against humanity, the Chamber
found that he had murdered three Tutsis and
participated in the mass killing of Tutsi
refugees. In finding him also guilty of extermination as a crime against humanity, the
Chamber followed the Vasiljevic judgment,
which held that the material element of
extermination “consists of any one act or
combination of acts which contributes to
the killing of a large number of individuals.”
The Chamber did not address whether these
two offenses amounted to impermissible
multiple convictions for the same conduct.
In finding Niyitegeka guilty of committing inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity, the Chamber followed the
Bagilishema decision that “an approving
spectator, who is held in such respect by
other perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their conduct,” may be guilty
of aiding and abetting a crime against
humanity under Article 6(1) of the ICTY
Statute. The Chamber decided that, by
encouraging the attackers during the murder, mutilation, and public display of a
prominent Tutsi leader, Niyitegeka had supported and encouraged the attack and aided
and abetted the commission of the crime.
The Chamber decided that by this act, and
by ordering the Interahamwe to sexually
mutilate the body of a dead Tutsi woman
and leave her in plain view for several days,
Niyitegeka had participated in a serious
attack on the human dignity of the Tutsi
community as a whole. His conduct thus
met the material requirements for an inhumane act of similar gravity to other enumerated crimes against humanity in the Statute
“such as would cause serious physical or
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mental suffering or constitute a serious
attack on human dignity.”
The Chamber rejected the charge that
Niyitegeka had incurred superior responsibility for any of these crimes. It cited
Musema for the proposition that “a civilian
superior may be charged with superior
responsibility only where he has effective
control, be it de jure or de facto, over the persons committing violations.” It followed
Delalic in defining “effective control” as the
ability to prevent subordinates from committing crimes or to punish them after they
commit the crimes. The Chamber found
that Niyitegeka’s position as a Minister of
Information did not by itself provide him
authority over the subordinates named by
the prosecution, such as bourgmestres or
Interahamwe. It also found that evidence of
influence in the community does not alone
establish a superior-subordinate relationship.
Thus, although Niyitegeka was found to
have led several attacks, to have acted in a
leadership position at meetings, and to have
instructed attackers to carry out his orders
on several occasions, the Chamber found
insufficient evidence that he had the ability
to prevent or punish the crimes committed
by the attackers. Consequently, the
Chamber did not examine the other elements of superior responsibility.
Citing Blaskic, the Trial Chamber found
it appropriate to impose a single sentence for
all offenses, as they could be recognized as
belonging to a single transaction. The
Chamber then sentenced Niyitegeka to life
imprisonment after taking into account the
gravity of the crimes, the practice of sentencing in Rwanda and in previous ICTR
judgments, and the totality of the circumstances in the case.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
PROSECUTOR V. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC,
CASE NO. IT-02-54
On June 16, 2004, Trial Chamber III of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) delivered a
Decision on the Motion for Judgement of
Acquittal in the case of Prosecutor v. Slobodan
Milosevic. As one of the most high profile cases
before the ICTY, the Milosevic trial has been
lengthy and complicated. On February 4,

2004, the Prosecution closed its case. On
March 3, 2004, Amici Curiae filed a motion on
behalf of the Accused arguing for acquittal
based on Rule 98bis of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICTY (Rules). On March
23, 2004, the Prosecution filed a motion in
response. The Accused did not file a motion
under Rule 98bis.
Rule 98bis outlines the procedures the
Accused must follow if he wishes to file a
Motion for Judgement of Acquittal. The
Accused may file a motion within seven
days after the close of the Prosecutor’s case
and, in any event, prior to the presentation
of evidence by the Defense pursuant to Rule
85 (A)(ii). Then, the Trial Chamber shall
order the entry of judgement of acquittal if
it finds that the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the
charges. The degree of proof necessary in a
Rule 98bis motion is “whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon which a tribunal of
fact could be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused on a particular charge in question.” Prosecutor v.
Jelisic, IT-95-10.
The Amici Curiae motion argued that, in
its case, the Prosecution failed to establish
the existence of an “armed conflict” in
Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999. The existence of an “armed conflict” is necessary to
prove some of the allegations included in the
Kosovo Indictment, which is part of the
larger indictment against Milosevic. The
motion also argued that all “grave breaches”
counts in the Croatia Indictment before
January 15, 1992, had to be dismissed
because the Prosecution failed to establish
that Croatia was a state before that time,
making the conflict non-international. Noninternational conflicts (and the war crimes
committed during them) are not under the
jurisdiction of the ICTY. The third argument in the motion stated that there was no
evidence that the Accused planned, instigated, ordered or committed, or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of genocide, any genocidal
acts, or that he was complicit in such. It also
argued that the mens rea requirement for
establishing the crime of genocide was
incompatible with the mens rea requirement
for another offense alleged in the Bosnia
Indictment, of command responsibility and
involvement in a joint criminal enterprise.
35

The Amici Curiae motion argued that, in
its case, the Prosecution failed to establish
the existence of an “armed conflict” in
Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999. The Trial
Chamber concluded that there was sufficient
evidence of an armed conflict in Kosovo at
the relevant times for the purposes of Rule
98bis. The Trial Chamber noted that an
armed conflict exists when there is “protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups.”
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1. This test calls
for an examination of the organization of the
parties to the conflict as well as the intensity
of the conflict. The Trial Chamber found
that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was
an organized military force, with an official
joint command structure, headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the ability to
procure, transport, and distribute arms. In
addition, the Trial Chamber noted that the
length or protracted nature of the conflict,
seriousness and increase in armed clashes,
the spread of clashes over the territory, the
increase in the number of governmental
forces sent to Kosovo, and the weapons used
by both parties indicated that the intensity
of the armed conflict passed the Tadic
“armed conflict test” and therefore survived
a Rule 98bis Motion for Acquittal.
The Amici Curiae motion argued that all
“grave breaches” counts in the Croatia
Indictment before January 15, 1992, had to
be dismissed because the Prosecution failed
to establish that Croatia was a state before
that time, making the conflict one of a noninternational nature. The Amici argued that
statehood occurred sometime between
when the European Community recognized
Croatia as a state on January 15, 1992, and
May 15, 1992, when Croatia joined the
United Nations. The Trial Chamber agreed
with the Prosecution that Croatia was a
state as of October 8, 1991, the date on
which its declaration of independence
became effective. The Trial Chamber noted
that the best known definition of a state is
provided by the Montevideo Convention,
Art.1 which reads: “The State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government;
and d) capacity to enter into relations with
other States.” The most decisive of these is
the last. The Trial Chamber noted that on
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October 8, 1991, the Presidents of Serbia
and Croatia entered into bilateral negotiations; representatives of Croatia entered
negotiations with international observers
and signed resulting agreements; and the
Croatian government was accepted by the
EU and UN Commissions and representatives. As a result of these and other factors,
the Trial Chamber concluded there was sufficient evidence that Croatia was a state by
October 8, 1991, and dismissed the Rule
98bis Motion with respect to the grave
breaches argument.
The third argument in the Motion stated
that there was no evidence that the Accused
possessed the “special intent” required for
the act of genocide. In addition, it argued
that there was no evidence that the Accused
planned, instigated, ordered, or committed,
or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of genocide,
any genocidal acts, or that he was complicit
in such. It also argued that the mens rea
requirement for establishing the crime of
genocide was incompatible with the mens rea
requirement for the third category of a joint
criminal enterprise and command responsibility, as alleged in the Bosnia Indictment.
Genocide is defined in the ICTY Statute as
“any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such: (a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; (e) forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.”
For the above acts to constitute genocide,
there is a “special intent” requirement that
the perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole
or in part, a protected group, in addition to
the criminal intent accompanying the
underlying offence. The intent can be
inferred from the evidence. The Trial
Chamber framed its analysis of this part of
the motion by asking five questions regarding whether the Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that genocide existed, which is the burden of proof for
a Motion of Acquittal, and then answered
them. The Trial Chamber concluded that for

all five questions related to genocide, it
would be possible for the Trial Chamber to
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the elements existed.
The Trial Chamber determined that there
was sufficient evidence to support each count
challenged in the three Indictments, but that
there was no or insufficient evidence to support certain allegations relevant to some of
the charges in the Indictments. It enumerated those charges in the Disposition. Since
then, the Milosevic Defense has begun, with
court-appointed defense lawyers helping
Milosevic present his case.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ON JULY 29, 2004, Louise Moreno-Ocampo,
Prosecutor for the International Criminal
Court (ICC), concluded that there was sufficient preliminary evidence to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Uganda.
Ocampo must now decide how he will proceed
in investigating allegations against parties from
both sides of the Ugandan conflict—the
Ugandan government and the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). In deciding its role in
this conflict, the ICC must consider the scope
of its jurisdictional mandate, its capacity to
remain impartial, and the benefits of prosecuting crimes committed by competing parties
embroiled in violent conflict.
Article 18 of the Rome Statute grants the
ICC jurisdiction to hear matters involving
member countries or through referral from
the Security Council when domestic courts
fail to investigate alleged violations with a
“genuine intent to provide justice.” The
Statute limits jurisdiction to widespread and
systematic acts of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity committed after
July 1, 2002. In December 2003, President
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda referred the case
to the ICC. Museveni claimed that the LRA
abducted over 20,000 children for use as
child soldiers. Further, the conflict has displaced approximately 1.5 million Ugandans.
The ICC is now pursuing charges against
LRA leadership for the deployment of child
soldiers, executions, torture, mutilation,
child sexual abuse, rape, sexual slavery, child
trafficking, looting, and destruction of civilian property. Complicating the prosecution
of perpetrators of atrocities is the involvement child soldiers in the conflict.
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Museveni’s referral raises questions about
ICC impartiality because the Prosecutor is
obligated to investigate charges against the
LRA on the Ugandan government’s behalf.
There are also allegations, however, that
Ugandan military personnel committed
widespread and systematic acts of torture,
rape, and deployment of child soldiers,
which would fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Human rights groups have blamed the
Ugandan government for the humanitarian
crisis that ensued after it ordered large segments of internally displaced people
(approximately 80% of the population) into
camps for years at a time. It remains to be
determined, therefore, how the Prosecutor
can represent both sides of this conflict
simultaneously.
These concerns come at a time when
Uganda has not yet finished implementing
the ICC’s Rome Statute; nor has it incorporated all ICC crimes into its own legal code.
Additionally, there are concerns that
President Museveni’s authority over judicial
appointments may undermine the neutrality
of the court system in Uganda as lower
courts might avoid pursuing charges against
military personnel for civilian abuses. The
courts may avoid prosecuting many of the
people the LRA kidnapped and forced to
fight against the government. Growing distrust in the judicial system has already led to
increasing acts of vigilante justice.
Despite the wide range of concerns
associated with prosecuting criminals in
this conflict, Ocampo has expressed a commitment to investigate both sides of this
conflict unconditionally. Effective trials in
local Ugandan courts could strengthen the
international perception of integrity of the
ICC as the ICC may find itself on both
sides of many armed conflicts in the future.
The ICC’s recognition as an impartial
forum to prosecute human rights offenses,
however, provides more legitimacy than trials conducted in local Ugandan courts that
are perceived as biased toward the government. If successful, the ICC could possibly
alleviate ethnic tension while establishing
itself as a credible institution.
Notwithstanding concerns about the
ICC’s role in this conflict, there are several
levels on which the ICC could address
human rights abuses in Uganda. The ICC
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could 1) draw international attention to the
conflict, 2) deter ongoing offenses, 3) force
government and military reformation, and
4) satisfy the general population’s desire for
justice.
The ICC must work to maintain impartiality, produce visible results, promote a sustainable peace, and work locally with members of civil society. This exercise of jurisdiction has major ramifications for the ICC. A
failure to remain impartial in Uganda could
undermine the ICC’s legitimacy as the only
permanent international court for the adjudication of war crimes. At the same time, a
failure to act would leave many victims of
gross human rights violations without any
means of recourse during periods of armed
conflict.

EAST TIMOR
2002, UNITED NATIONS Security

IN MAY
Council Resolution 1410 established the UN
Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET). Its mandate set out three main
goals: 1) to assist core administrative structures
critical to political stability in East Timor; 2) to
provide interim law enforcement and public
security; and 3) to maintain external and internal security in East Timor. Security Council
Resolution 1543 scaled back UNMISET on
May 14, 2004, and revised its tasks to include
the following elements: 1) support for the public administration and justice system of TimorLeste and for justice in the area of serious
crimes; 2) support to the development of law
enforcement in Timor-Leste; 3) support for
the security and stability of Timor-Leste. This
change reflected a request by the UN Secretary
General on April 29, 2004, to reduce the size
of the UN presence in Timor-Leste.
With the expiration of UNMISET’s
mandate rapidly approaching in May 2005,
there is growing concern about whether
known perpetrators of atrocities during East
Timor’s secession will ever be brought to justice. The conflict in East Timor originated in
1960 when the country was governed by
Portugal and the UN recognized East Timor
as a “Non-Self-Governing Territory.” When
Portugal tried to establish a provisional government and a general assembly to resolve
East Timor’s status in 1974, a civil war
erupted between Timorese who sought independence and those who wanted to reinte-

grate into Indonesia. After Portugal’s withdrawal, Indonesia annexed East Timor as a
province. In 1998, Indonesia proposed limited autonomy for East Timor, and, in 1999,
Indonesia and Portugal signed an accord
which moved East Timor closer to independence. The accord established that the
United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) would monitor the movement
towards independence. Regrettably, however, as the first elections approached in 1999,
anti-secessionist militias launched a campaign of violence against pro-secessionists
that killed between 1,000 and 2,000 East
Timorese civilians and displaced over
500,000 people. Despite the outbreaks of
violence, UNAMET’s peace-keeping efforts
resulted in Indonesia’s eventual withdrawal
and East Timor’s transition toward independence.
Following East Timor’s independence in
March 2002, the UN and Indonesia established two regional courts to convict perpetrators of the 1999 atrocities, many of whom
were Indonesian military officials. The
United Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET) spearheaded the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes of the Dili
District Court to adjudicate war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture committed by Indonesian occupation
forces during the East Timorese push for
independence. In response to pressure from
the international community, Indonesia
established the Ad hoc Human Rights Court
for East Timor in Jarkarta, which maintains
jurisdiction over perpetrators in Indonesia.
Both the Special Panels for Serious
Crimes and the Indonesian Human Rights
Court for East Timor have been strongly
criticized for their failure to prosecute
Indonesian war criminals. While more than
50 of the 380 indictees have been convicted
in the UN-supported Special Panels in Dili,
only about 6 out of 18 indicted by the Ad
Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta have
been convicted, and all were East Timorese.
Further, those convicted are predominantly
viewed as scapegoats for Indonesian military
commanders. The Special Panels for Serious
Crimes could not conduct trials for all those
it indicted because Indonesian authorities
refused to extradite military officers indicted by the court. At the present rate, the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East
37

Timor likely will not complete trial level
cases before the expiration of the UN mandate in May 2005. The likelihood that the
court will conclude appellate level prosecutions is even lower.
Further complicating the situation is the
issuance of an arrest warrant for Indonesian
presidential candidate General Wironto by a
UN-funded judge acting under the authority of East Timor’s judiciary. Wironto is
accused of commanding members of the
Indonesian militia that perpetrated human
rights abuses against ethnic Timorese. His
arrest soured relations between UN prosecutors and the Prosecutor-General of the
Timor Leste judiciary, who attempted to
amend Wiranto’s indictment in response to
political pressure. Many members of
Timorese civil society view the ProsecutorGeneral’s conduct as evidence that the tribunals are ineffective and subject to political
influences.
Victims, their families, and members of
Timor-Leste civil society have staunchly criticized the Indonesian Court as being biased
in favor of Indonesian suspects. The failure
of the Jakarta court to convict Indonesian
suspects has only served to feed the widespread perception that its impartiality is
feigned to placate the international community. Long after the creation of the Ad Hoc
Human Rights Court in Jakarta, many lead
offenders remain at large, including
Indonesian officers and militias who killed
over 1,500 people when East Timor seceded.
Further, Indonesia’s constitution does not
permit criminal liability for crimes committed prior the implementation of the law
allegedly violated. Consequently, Indonesia’s
new Constitutional Court found the prosecution of Bali bomber Maskur Abdul Kadir
unconstitutional on grounds of retrospectivity. This ruling is binding on the Jakarta tribunal despite the non-retrospectivity principle of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. A final ruling in the
Jakarta tribunal denying retrospective prosecutions would allow many accused violators
to escape conviction.
To address the many concerns with the
transitional justice process, victims and their
families, members of government, jurists,
diplomats, and social justice advocates convened on September 23, 2004, in Dili to dis-
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cuss more effective options for reconciliation.
Sukehiro
Hasegawa,
Special
Representative to the UN Secretary General,
addressed the conference, where participants
overwhelmingly advocated for an international criminal court akin to the
International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda
(ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
While funding sources for an international
tribunal remain undetermined, all agreed
that a formal and credible international solution is needed.
Participants in the conference identified
five potential avenues of recourse: 1) creating an international Commission of Experts
responsible for monitoring and making recommendations for the Jakarta proceedings
and the Special Panels in Dili; 2) continuing
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes; 3)
establishing an international tribunal; 4)
deploying
an
International
Truth
Commission; and 5) extending the mandate
for the Commission for Reception Truth
and Reconciliation (CAVR), which was
established in February 2002 to investigate
human rights violations that occurred
between 1974 and 1999 in Timor-Leste.
The proposal for a Commission of
Experts would ensure that both courts are
pursuing human rights violations without
regard to the suspect’s race or nationality.
The UN Secretary General, however, will
not commit to a Commission of Experts
until it is shown that both courts have failed
to hold the perpetrators accountable. United
Nations intervention has received lukewarm
response from the Timor-Leste government,
as it fears that an international tribunal
might impede attempts to reestablish economic ties with Indonesia. The government’s reluctance, combined with hesitation
by the U.S. to offend Indonesia, has further
discouraged the establishment of an international court.
To date, the United Nations has issued no
formal statement on whether it will officially
support or fund an international tribunal.
On September 22, 2004, Secretary General
Kofi Annan cited East Timor as capable of
achieving progress with adequate training
and support. He did not specify, however,
whether the UN would provide the funding
necessary to operate an international court.
Special Representative to the UN Secretary

General Sukehiro Hasegawa agreed that a
purely international process is needed, but
never committed to funding the operation.
Without support from the Gusmao administration, the UN has no incentive to press for
an international tribunal.
The future prosecution of atrocities in
Timor-Leste remains uncertain. International
consensus is far from being achieved; however, there is a growing consensus among
victims, victims’ families, members of
Timor-Leste civil society, and human rights
groups that justice in East Timor requires an
objective and neutral international body to
adjudicate the heinous offenses of 1999. The
conclusion of UNMISET’s mandate commands cooperation among members of the
East Timorese civil society and the global
community. With that call emerges a new
responsibility for the Indonesian and TimorLeste governments to hold perpetrators of
the atrocities accountable.

CAMBODIA
ON OCTOBER 5, 2004, after almost ten years
of delays, the Cambodian Parliament’s lower
house ratified an agreement with the United
Nations to create an internationalized tribunal
in Cambodia called the Extraordinary
Chambers. This tribunal will try the few surviving leaders of the Communist Khmer
Rouge for atrocities committed during their
four-year rule from 1975-1979. Seven major
figures, all in their 60s and 70s, are likely to be
the focus of indictments.
For many, the creation of this court is long
overdue. Figures estimate that 1.7 million
Cambodians—one quarter of the population—were killed under the Khmer Rouge by
torture, execution, starvation, and disease.
Almost every family in the country lost members during the Khmer Rouge’s rule. In the
aftermath of these atrocities, Cambodia has
had no truth commissions or trials addressing
the national tragedy of Pol Pot’s regime.
The proposed tribunal is hybrid in form
and has similarities to other internationalized tribunals. Like other international tribunals, the Cambodian tribunal will have
the power to prosecute acts of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions. It will also prosecute violations of the 1954 Hague
Convention for Protection of Cultural
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Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and
crimes against internationally protected persons pursuant to the Vienna Convention of
1961 on Diplomatic Relations, neither of
which has ever been addressed in an international criminal tribunal before. Additionally,
Cambodia’s tribunal will be the first internationalized court in which domestic judges
constitute a majority.
The Cambodian tribunal will be comprised of five judges—three Cambodian and
two international. This poses a particular
challenge in a country whose lawyers were
targets of the Khmer Rouge’s violence. As a
result, few sitting judges in Cambodia have
formal legal training. Cambodian courts also
have little judicial independence. The
United Nations’ involvement, however, is
expected to ensure that international experts
and standards of due process will be integrated into the court’s investigations and trials and that the judges and staff of the court
will receive adequate training. Decisions of
the Extraordinary Chambers will require a
super-majority vote, with at least one international judge consenting. The UN will not
have formal legal power over the court but
will contribute judicial officers, funding,
and administrative expertise.
While the commitment to establish an
internationalized tribunal is a significant
accomplishment, there are still several obstacles ahead for the court. Financing for the
tribunal is perhaps the most immediate challenge. The UN agreement envisions three
years of trials, a staff of 2,000, and an operating budget of approximately US $60 million. Additionally, although two of the
expected indictees are already in custody, the
leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, died in
1998. Finally, the Extraordinary Chambers
will have to be developed and staffed. Trials
are not expected to start before mid–2005.
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